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Abstract:	  I	  conducted	  my	  research	  for	  this	  paper	  during	  a	  three-­‐week	  internship	  at	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  in	  Derry.	  I	  gathered	  evidence	  from	  a	  series	  of	  declassified	  British	  government	  documents	  provided	  to	  me	  by	  the	  center.	  I	  focus	  my	  study	  on	  the	  British	  government’s	  attitude	  towards	  sectarian	  assassinations,	  particularly	  committed	  by	  loyalist	  paramilitaries,	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  1970’s.	  I	  examine	  the	  issues	  of	  responding	  to	  international	  pressure,	  framing	  the	  problem,	  evaluating	  security	  force	  effectiveness,	  and	  screening	  strategies.	  I	  find	  that	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  the	  British	  government	  hid	  information	  to	  downplay	  the	  severity	  of	  loyalist-­‐led	  murder	  campaigns	  and	  instigated	  policies	  that	  did	  little	  to	  curb	  the	  violence.	  I	  also	  analyze	  the	  role	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  played	  in	  shaping	  my	  work	  and	  argue	  for	  the	  utility	  of	  conducting	  research	  in	  an	  activist	  environment.	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Introduction:	  It	  was	  6:10	  pm	  on	  a	  dark	  January	  evening	  in	  1976	  in	  Whitecross,	  South	  Armagh,	  and	  Anthony	  Reavey	  was	  watching	  television	  with	  his	  two	  brothers	  in	  his	  living	  room	  when	  a	  man	  holding	  a	  machine	  gun	  burst	  through	  the	  hall	  door	  and	  opened	  fire.	  His	  brothers,	  John	  Martin	  and	  Brian,	  were	  killed	  immediately,	  but	  Anthony	  was	  able	  to	  escape	  to	  another	  room.	  He	  died	  of	  a	  brain	  hemorrhage	  a	  month	  later.	  The	  gunmen	  left	  after	  searching	  the	  house	  for	  more	  victims.	  Just	  twenty	  minutes	  later,	  a	  few	  miles	  away,	  three	  masked	  men	  burst	  into	  the	  O’Dowd	  family’s	  living	  room	  as	  a	  group	  of	  family	  members	  were	  gathered	  around	  a	  brother	  playing	  piano.	  The	  men	  killed	  three	  and	  injured	  a	  number	  of	  other	  family	  members1.	  	  Attacks	  like	  these	  were	  shockingly	  common	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  in	  the	  early	  1970’s.	  By	  the	  time	  these	  murders	  occurred	  in	  1976,	  sectarian	  assassinations	  had	  already	  taken	  the	  lives	  of	  hundreds	  of	  civilians,	  most	  of	  whom	  were	  Catholic.	  While	  the	  British	  government	  officially	  condemned	  all	  sectarian	  murders,	  suspicions	  arose	  that	  the	  government	  was	  colluding	  with,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  tolerating,	  loyalist	  paramilitaries.	  Families	  of	  murder	  victims	  endured	  not	  only	  grief,	  but	  also	  frustration	  and	  distrust	  when	  the	  government’s	  depiction	  of	  events	  did	  not	  match	  what	  they	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  reality.	  ‘	  The	  Reavey	  and	  O’Dowd	  families	  felt	  the	  British	  government	  grossly	  mistreated	  the	  murders	  of	  their	  loved	  ones.	  According	  to	  a	  statement	  the	  family	  presented	  with	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center,	  the	  British	  government	  framed	  the	  attack	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  "Interim	  Report	  on	  the	  Report	  of	  the	  Independent	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Bombing	  of	  Kay’s	  Tavern,	  Dundalk."	  Tithe	  an	  Oireachtais.	  (Joint	  Committee	  on	  Justice,	  Equality,	  Defence	  and	  Women’s	  Rights,	  July	  2006.	  Web.	  27	  Nov.	  2012).	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as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  feud	  between	  republican	  and	  loyalist	  paramilitary	  groups,	  when	  in	  reality	  the	  victims	  were	  innocent	  civilians.	  They	  claim	  as	  well	  that	  security	  forces	  and	  British	  army	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  murders2.	  	  Along	  with	  feelings	  of	  loss,	  the	  families	  have	  harbored	  deep	  skepticism	  and	  resentment	  towards	  the	  British	  government	  for	  decades.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  truth	  recovery	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center,	  families	  like	  the	  Reaveys	  and	  O’Dowds	  have	  reinvestigated	  murders	  during	  the	  Troubles	  and	  have	  provided	  an	  alternative	  telling	  of	  history	  that	  includes	  details	  they	  believe	  were	  purposely	  excluded	  by	  the	  British	  government.	  As	  time	  passes,	  more	  academics,	  grassroots	  organizations,	  and	  investigators	  research	  alleged	  injustices	  committed	  by	  the	  British	  government,	  particularly	  during	  the	  most	  violent	  years	  of	  the	  Troubles.	  Some	  of	  these	  investigations	  have	  resulted	  in	  public	  apologies	  by	  the	  British	  prime	  minister,	  such	  as	  the	  investigations	  into	  the	  murder	  of	  the	  solicitor	  Pat	  Finucane,	  whose	  human	  rights	  inquiries	  served	  as	  the	  inspiration	  for	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center.	  	  	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  broadly	  examine	  the	  attitude	  and	  strategies	  of	  the	  British	  government	  regarding	  sectarian	  murders	  in	  the	  early	  to	  mid	  1970’s	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,	  particularly	  in	  relationship	  to	  the	  international	  community.	  The	  research	  is	  drawn	  almost	  entirely	  through	  declassified	  British	  government	  documents	  found	  and	  provided	  to	  me	  by	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center.	  I	  begin	  by	  outlining	  my	  methods	  for	  conducting	  my	  research,	  both	  through	  formally	  analyzing	  documents	  and	  informally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  "Statement	  from	  the	  Families	  of	  Those	  Murdered	  at	  Donnelly’s	  Bar,	  Silverbridge,	  outside	  Kay’s	  Tavern,	  Dundalk	  and	  in	  the	  Reavey	  and	  O’Dowd	  Homes."	  (The	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center,	  9	  July	  2007.	  Web.	  27	  Nov.	  2012).	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volunteering	  at	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center.	  The	  analysis	  section	  of	  this	  paper	  begins	  with	  a	  background	  context	  for	  the	  information	  I	  gathered.	  Next	  it	  discusses	  the	  British	  government	  faced	  in	  disclosing	  assassination	  statistics	  in	  the	  face	  of	  pressure	  from	  the	  international	  community,	  particularly	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland.	  Additionally,	  I	  examine	  the	  debate	  within	  the	  government	  regarding	  defining	  sectarian	  assassinations	  as	  well	  the	  debate	  over	  which	  individuals	  were	  to	  blame	  for	  them.	  The	  analysis	  section	  ends	  with	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  British	  government’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  success	  of	  security	  forces	  in	  handling	  the	  problem	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  solutions	  the	  government	  tried	  to	  pursue	  as	  a	  response.	  	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  my	  analysis,	  I	  consider	  how	  my	  research	  was	  conducted	  and	  its	  impact.	  	  I	  frame	  my	  research	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  and	  illustrate	  how	  working	  with	  activists	  like	  Paul	  O’Connor	  shaped	  the	  work	  and	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  doing	  research	  outside	  of	  an	  academic	  environment.	  I	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  utility	  of	  my	  research	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  transitional	  justice	  and	  end	  this	  section	  by	  reflecting	  on	  my	  personal	  experience	  doing	  this	  project.	  	  	  ,	  The	  documents	  suggest	  that	  while	  explicit	  evidence	  of	  collusion	  or	  encouragement	  of	  loyalist	  paramilitary	  violence	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  documents.	  However,	  there	  are	  strong	  patterns	  of	  inconsistency	  and	  apathy	  in	  the	  way	  the	  issue	  of	  sectarian	  assassinations,	  particularly	  committed	  by	  loyalists,	  are	  portrayed	  internationally	  and	  dealt	  with	  on	  Northern	  Ireland’s	  soil.	  I	  also	  find	  that	  while	  it	  may	  lack	  the	  impartiality	  and	  distance	  of	  an	  academic	  environment,	  conducting	  research	  among	  activists	  has	  unique	  advantageous	  in	  motivating	  the	  creation	  of	  useful	  information.	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Methods:	  
Conducting	  the	  Research	  	   I	  conducted	  my	  research	  in	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center,	  a	  nonpartisan	  organization	  that	  advocates	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Northern	  Ireland.	  The	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  engages	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  activities.	  These	  include,	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to,	  investigating	  individual	  cases	  of	  murders	  during	  the	  Troubles,	  exposing	  British	  government	  collusion	  with	  paramilitary	  activity,	  working	  with	  the	  Historical	  Enquiries	  Team	  and	  Police	  Ombudsman	  to	  accurately	  recount	  the	  past,	  and	  cooperating	  with	  various	  NGO’s	  on	  human	  rights	  projects	  and	  research	  worldwide3.	  My	  initial	  goal	  was	  to	  work	  on	  individual	  cases	  with	  the	  center	  but	  was	  too	  limited	  due	  to	  confidentiality	  reasons.	  	   The	  idea	  for	  the	  project	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  arose	  from	  discussions	  I	  had	  Paul	  O’Connor,	  from	  the	  Derry	  office	  of	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center.	  He	  informed	  me	  that	  he	  and	  his	  colleagues	  on	  several	  occasions	  had	  traveled	  to	  the	  National	  Archives	  to	  search	  through	  and	  make	  copies	  of	  useful	  documents	  that	  had	  been	  declassified	  by	  the	  British	  government.	  He	  provided	  me	  with	  a	  set	  of	  documents	  he	  had	  gathered	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2009	  that	  he	  thought	  should	  be	  investigated	  further	  and	  shared	  some	  potential	  ideas	  for	  a	  project.	  The	  documents	  involve	  the	  issue	  of	  sectarian	  violence,	  primarily	  from	  the	  year	  1975.	  	  	   During	  my	  last	  two	  weeks	  in	  Derry,	  I	  read	  approximately	  75	  declassified	  British	  government	  documents,	  searching	  for	  evidence	  of	  any	  British	  government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  "Core	  Activities."	  (The	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center,	  n.d.	  Web.	  27	  Nov.	  2012).	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attitude	  towards	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  I	  made	  note	  of	  any	  instance	  that	  the	  government	  mentioned	  a	  position	  on	  sectarian	  assassinations,	  kept	  useful	  quotes	  from	  every	  document,	  and	  later	  sorted	  through	  them	  to	  find	  patterns	  and	  contradictions	  in	  the	  findings.	  Through	  this	  process	  I	  developed	  the	  argument	  for	  this	  paper.	  	   Going	  through	  the	  documents	  was	  only	  one	  portion	  of	  my	  research,	  however.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  earlier,	  my	  research	  was	  part	  of	  an	  immersive	  experience	  in	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  and	  Derry.	  Thus,	  a	  portion	  of	  my	  research	  experience	  focused	  on	  the	  role	  my	  environment	  played	  in	  process	  of	  creating	  my	  project.	  Just	  as	  my	  initial	  topic	  grew	  from	  a	  conversation	  with	  Paul	  O’Connor,	  I	  had	  many	  other	  informal	  conversations	  with	  Paul	  about	  his	  opinions	  on	  my	  topic,	  often	  as	  we	  walked	  home	  from	  the	  office.	  I	  tried	  to	  make	  notes	  of	  the	  way	  our	  conversations	  impacted	  my	  work.	  I	  also	  volunteered	  with	  various	  tasks	  in	  the	  center	  and	  observed	  its	  activities.	  Doing	  so	  taught	  me	  about	  the	  functions	  and	  goals	  of	  truth	  recovery	  and	  human	  rights	  oriented	  organizations.	  I	  began	  to	  understand	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  center	  and	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  in	  accomplishing	  them.	  I	  kept	  daily	  notes	  of	  my	  observations	  as	  well	  as	  my	  opinions	  and	  how	  they	  changed	  and	  progressed	  during	  my	  time	  at	  the	  center.	  I	  reflected	  on	  how	  these	  opinions	  and	  my	  observations	  could	  affect	  my	  research.	  I	  also	  tried	  to	  reflect	  on	  my	  research	  process,	  what	  challenges	  and	  rewards	  came	  from	  interpreting	  primary	  sources.	  Additionally,	  I	  had	  informal	  conversations	  with	  other	  employees	  and	  visitors	  to	  the	  center	  about	  life	  in	  Derry	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland	  now	  and	  during	  the	  Troubles,	  which	  I	  kept	  notes	  of	  as	  well.	  I	  found	  that	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experience	  in	  the	  field	  of	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  deeply	  influenced	  the	  shape	  and	  goals	  of	  my	  project,	  the	  results	  of	  which	  I	  discuss	  further	  on	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  	   While	  gathering	  my	  research,	  I	  came	  across	  a	  few	  challenges	  that	  should	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  paper.	  First,	  my	  documents	  were	  selected	  by,	  and	  my	  research	  was	  conducted	  in,	  an	  office	  of	  activists,	  dedicated	  to	  exposing	  British	  government	  collusion.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  my	  environment	  had	  an	  impact	  in	  shaping	  and	  directing	  this	  paper.	  Despite	  this,	  all	  the	  evidence	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  drawn	  directly	  from	  British	  archives	  without	  manipulation	  and	  I	  do	  my	  best	  to	  interpret	  it	  objectively	  without	  any	  predetermined	  political	  goals.	  However,	  they	  are	  by	  no	  means	  supported	  or	  representative	  enough	  to	  make	  definitive	  statements	  about	  what	  occurred	  during	  the	  Troubles.	  I	  attempt	  to	  present	  my	  evidence	  in	  a	  way	  that	  acknowledges	  these	  limitations	  without	  drowning	  them	  in	  academic	  caveats	  and	  constraints	  that	  stifle	  their	  rhetorical	  power	  completely.	  I	  believe	  that	  these	  interpretations	  can	  be	  useful,	  even	  if	  they	  come	  from	  a	  more	  activist	  than	  academic	  environment,	  a	  sentiment	  revisited	  later	  in	  this	  paper.	  Therefore,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  reiterate	  that	  my	  insights,	  though	  void	  of	  any	  political	  goals,	  are	  influenced	  by	  activists	  and	  in	  no	  way	  incorporate	  all	  perspectives	  on	  the	  issue.	  Another	  challenge	  to	  my	  work	  involves	  documentation.	  The	  research	  gathered	  by	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  in	  2009	  did	  not	  include	  reference	  numbers.	  My	  method	  of	  citation,	  therefore,	  includes	  all	  information	  I	  know	  about	  the	  documents	  but	  lacks	  specific	  National	  Archive’s	  reference	  numbers	  in	  some	  instances..	  This	  may	  hinder	  the	  ability	  to	  revisit	  the	  documents,	  though	  it	  does	  not	  inhibit	  it	  completely.	  The	  exact	  titles	  for	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some	  British	  officials	  composing	  or	  receiving	  letters	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  not	  known	  as	  well.	  	  	   An	  extensive	  body	  of	  literature	  already	  exists	  concerning	  British	  government	  collusion	  and	  sectarian	  violence	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  It	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  review	  even	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  literature	  in	  the	  length	  of	  this	  paper.	  However,	  a	  substantial	  summary	  of	  the	  issue	  was	  done	  by	  the	  Center	  for	  Civil	  and	  Human	  Rights	  	  at	  Notre	  Dame	  Law	  School4.	  The	  panel	  involved	  investigated	  76	  murders	  during	  the	  Troubles	  and	  found	  that	  the	  British	  government	  had	  colluded	  with	  loyalist	  paramilitaries	  in	  74	  of	  them.	  The	  panel	  also	  claims	  that	  by	  1973	  senior	  officials	  were	  aware	  of	  collusion	  happening	  within	  the	  security	  forces	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  The	  report	  concludes	  that	  collusion	  did	  occur	  in	  the	  early	  1970’s	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  and	  that	  it	  was	  a	  widespread	  problem.	  The	  report	  also	  claims	  that	  the	  past	  and	  current	  investigations	  were	  inadequate	  at	  exposing	  these	  injustices.	  Many	  articles	  and	  investigations	  have	  resulted	  in	  similar	  findings.	  	  	   Some	  investigations	  of	  the	  British	  government’s	  behavior	  have	  gone	  deeper	  into	  specific	  cases.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  examples	  of	  this	  is	  the	  murder	  of	  the	  Belfast	  solicitor	  Pat	  Finucane.	  Finucane	  handled	  a	  series	  of	  high	  profile	  cases	  involving	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  1980’s	  including	  the	  Hunger	  Strikes,	  Casement	  Park	  Trials,	  and	  a	  prisoner’s	  rights	  case	  involving	  solitary	  confinement.	  He	  was	  repeatedly	  harassed	  by	  RUC	  members	  and	  civilians	  for	  his	  work	  and	  received	  a	  series	  of	  death	  threats.	  At	  7:25	  PM	  on	  February	  12,	  1989,	  Finucane	  was	  shot	  in	  his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Cassel,	  Douglas,	  Susie	  Kemp,	  Piers	  Pigou,	  and	  Stephen	  Sawyer.	  Report	  of	  the	  Independent	  International	  Panel	  on	  
Alleged	  Collusion	  in	  Sectarian	  Killings	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  (Rep.	  Notre	  Dame:	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Law	  School,	  2006.	  Print).	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home	  more	  than	  a	  dozen	  times	  in	  front	  of	  his	  wife	  and	  children.	  The	  Lawyers	  Committee	  for	  Human	  Rights	  calls	  for	  further	  investigations	  into	  the	  murder,	  especially	  as	  new	  evidence	  has	  come	  to	  light.	  They	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  the	  British	  government	  colluded	  with	  loyalist	  paramilitaries	  for	  the	  murder5.	  Cases	  like	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  murder	  were	  fairly	  common	  during	  the	  Troubles	  but	  the	  Finucane	  case	  has	  garnered	  a	  particular	  amount	  of	  international	  recognition.	  	   A	  few	  cases	  have	  been	  investigated	  with	  the	  help	  of	  declassified	  British	  government	  documents.	  One	  example	  is	  Paul	  O’Connor	  and	  Alan	  Brecknell’s	  investigation	  of	  loyalist	  infiltration	  in	  the	  UDR.	  They	  argue	  that	  UDA	  and	  UVF	  members	  joined	  the	  UDR,	  largely	  to	  acquire	  weapons.	  The	  British	  government	  did	  little	  to	  investigate	  or	  intervene	  with	  this	  problem,	  meaning	  the	  state	  was	  essentially	  fueling	  loyalist	  paramilitaries	  that	  were	  responsible	  for	  gruesome	  sectarian	  violence.	  O’Connor	  and	  Brecknell’s	  piece	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  clues	  from	  various	  declassified	  documents	  can	  be	  compiled	  to	  reveal	  injustices	  and	  shortcomings	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  British	  government,	  particularly	  in	  the	  early	  1970’s6.	  The	  piece	  is	  fairly	  specific	  to	  the	  UDR.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  a	  study	  of	  general	  attitudes	  towards	  sectarian	  assassinations,	  through	  declassified	  documents,	  has	  never	  been	  done.	  Therefore,	  my	  argument	  can	  help	  provide	  a	  context	  and	  background	  for	  some	  of	  the	  more	  specific	  cases.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Beyond	  Collusion	  The	  U.K.	  Security	  Forces	  and	  the	  Murder	  of	  Patrick	  Finucane.	  Lawyer's	  Committee	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  2003.	  Web.	  1	  Dec.	  2012.	  <http://rfjusa.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2010/12/beyond_collusion.pdf>.	  	  6	  Paul	  O’Connor	  and	  Alan	  Brecknell.	  "British	  Counter-­‐insurgency	  Practice	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  in	  the	  1970s-­‐	  a	  Legitimate	  Response	  or	  State	  Terror?"	  (Counter-­‐Terrorism	  and	  State	  Political	  Violence:	  The	  'war	  on	  Terror'	  as	  
Terror.	  Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012.	  N.	  pag.	  Print.).	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Analysis:	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  section,	  I	  analyze	  the	  documents	  through	  a	  historical	  and	  political	  framework.	  I	  incorporate	  events	  of	  the	  time	  and	  the	  political	  context	  into	  my	  interpretations	  of	  the	  motives	  and	  meanings	  behind	  the	  documents.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  section	  involves	  a	  more	  contemporary	  framework	  of	  truth	  recovery	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  healing	  on	  an	  individual	  and	  community	  level.	  I	  look	  at	  the	  factors	  that	  impacted	  my	  research	  and	  how	  my	  work	  has	  unique	  role	  in	  contributing	  to	  collective	  understanding	  of	  the	  Troubles	  and	  bringing	  a	  sense	  of	  justice	  to	  those	  impacted	  by	  the	  conflict.	  	  	  The	  early	  1970’s	  were	  an	  incredibly	  turbulent	  time	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  The	  civil	  rights	  demonstrations	  of	  the	  1960’s	  and	  the	  increased	  British	  presence	  as	  a	  response	  fueled	  recruitment	  into	  both	  republican	  and	  loyalist	  paramilitary	  groups.	  Violence	  peaked	  in	  the	  early	  1970’s	  as	  sectarian	  assassinations	  were	  becoming	  more	  frequent	  and	  gruesome.	  The	  nationalist	  community	  had	  become	  inflamed	  over	  the	  shootings	  that	  occurred	  in	  Bloody	  Sunday.	  Pub	  bombs	  and	  disappearances	  were	  shockingly	  common	  and	  the	  violence	  was	  beginning	  to	  garner	  international	  attention.	  The	  British	  governments	  actions,	  particularly	  regarding	  detaining	  republican	  prisoners,	  were	  being	  questioned	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights7.	  	  	  
Decoding	  the	  Documents	  
Mounting	  International	  Pressure	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Beyond	  Collusion	  The	  U.K.	  Security	  Forces	  and	  the	  Murder	  of	  Patrick	  Finucane.	  Lawyer's	  Committee	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  2003.	  Web.	  1	  Dec.	  2012.	  <http://rfjusa.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2010/12/beyond_collusion.pdf>.	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By	  1975,	  declassified	  documents	  reveal	  that	  critics	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  vocal	  about	  the	  British	  government’s	  actions	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,	  particularly	  regarding	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  A	  news	  article	  from	  the	  Irish	  Times	  dated	  April	  14,	  1975	  states	  that,	  “Cardinal	  Conway	  and	  the	  nine	  Northern	  Irish	  bishops	  yesterday	  condemned	  the	  ‘campaign	  of	  sectarian	  murders’	  and	  said	  that	  altogether	  insufficient	  attention	  was	  being	  devoted	  to	  them”8.	  In	  the	  article,	  the	  Cardinal	  and	  bishops	  criticize	  the	  British	  government	  for	  tolerating	  the	  violence	  and	  allowing	  the	  organizations	  that	  they	  believed	  were	  responsible	  to	  remain	  legal.	  There	  are	  further	  records	  of	  the	  Cardinal’s	  criticism	  in	  the	  note	  of	  the	  meeting	  between	  Minister	  of	  State,	  Mr.	  Roland	  Moyle,	  and	  Cardinal	  Conway	  Held	  at	  Armagh	  on	  April	  9th.	  In	  the	  meeting	  the	  Cardinal	  claims	  it	  is	  “a	  broad	  aim	  of	  British	  Government	  police	  to	  appease	  the	  Unionists”,	  which	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  very	  few	  loyalists	  and	  no	  British	  soldiers	  had	  been	  convicted	  for	  sectarian	  murders9.	  	  The	  British	  government	  discredits	  his	  remarks,	  arguing	  that	  the	  Cardinal	  “is	  very	  much	  the	  child	  of	  his	  own	  environment-­‐	  he	  hails	  from	  the	  Falls	  Road-­‐	  and	  he	  has	  shown	  little	  flexibility	  in	  his	  attitudes”10.	  Nevertheless,	  meetings	  with	  the	  Cardinal	  and	  the	  media	  attention	  they	  received	  indicate	  that	  by	  1975	  the	  British	  government	  receiving	  pressure	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  sectarian	  assassinations	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  "Cardinal,	  Bishops	  Condemn	  ‘Ghastly	  Campaign’."	  The	  Irish	  Times	  [Dublin]	  14	  Apr.	  1975:	  n.	  pag.	  Print.	  	  9	  Note	  of	  a	  Meeting	  Between	  Mr.	  Roland	  Moyle	  MP,	  Minister	  of	  State,	  and	  Cardinal	  Conway	  Held	  at	  Armagh,	  April	  9,	  1975,	  11:00	  AM.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  May	  27,	  2009).	  	  	  10J.	  N.	  Allan,	  Letter	  to	  A	  G	  L	  Turner.	  (1	  May	  1975.	  The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  27	  May	  2009).	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Perhaps	  even	  more	  influential	  than	  the	  Cardinal’s	  criticisms	  were	  those	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland.	  A	  draft	  of	  a	  letter	  from	  British	  official	  B	  M	  Webster	  to	  the	  Chief	  Constable	  and	  Grand	  Officer	  Commanding	  (GOC)	  and	  Chief	  Constable	  dated	  May	  15,	  1975	  lists	  these	  concerns.	  He	  states	  that	  the	  Republic	  has	  expressed	  concern	  to	  Great	  Britain	  that,	  "the	  majority	  of	  victims	  are	  Catholics,	  the	  murders	  of	  Catholics	  are	  less	  enthusiastically	  investigated	  than	  the	  murders	  of	  Protestants,	  and	  when	  charges	  of	  murder	  are	  brought	  they	  are	  not	  pursed	  diligently	  to	  convictions”11.	  Given	  these	  suspicions,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland	  requested	  that	  the	  British	  government	  provide	  them	  with	  statistics	  on	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  G	  Authur,	  G	  W	  Harding	  discusses	  a	  meeting	  he	  had	  with	  the	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  in	  Dublin	  on	  December	  12,	  1975.	  He	  states	  that	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland	  asked	  that	  Britain	  give	  them	  a	  sectarian	  breakdown	  of	  the	  convictions	  and	  arrests	  made	  for	  sectarian	  assassinations12.	  This	  was	  one	  of	  multiple	  occasions	  listed	  in	  the	  documents	  that	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland	  requested	  sectarian	  statistics	  involving	  violence	  and	  security	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  The	  declassified	  documents	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  position	  Britain	  was	  in	  by	  1975.	  Media	  reports	  had	  sounded	  an	  alarm	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  sectarian	  assassinations,	  sparking	  outrage	  particularly	  amongst	  those	  with	  connections	  to	  the	  Catholic	  community.	  Britain	  found	  itself	  forced	  to	  answer	  difficult	  questions	  and	  produce	  evidence	  concerning	  an	  issue	  that	  might	  have	  damning	  consequences	  to	  its	  international	  reputation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  B.M.	  Webster,	  Draft	  of	  letter	  to	  Grand	  Officer	  Commanding	  and	  Chief	  Constable.	  15	  May	  1975.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  27	  May	  2009).	  	  	  12	  G.	  W.	  Harding,	  Letter	  to	  G	  Aurthur.	  13	  December	  1974.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  27	  May	  2009).	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The	  British	  Response	  The	  British	  struggled	  to	  compose	  a	  strategy	  of	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  these	  criticisms	  and	  demands.	  Most	  of	  the	  government’s	  initial	  response,	  according	  to	  the	  declassified	  documents,	  was	  shrouded	  in	  discussions	  of	  how	  to	  define	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  Publicly,	  the	  government	  of	  Great	  Britain	  repeatedly	  made	  the	  argument	  that	  sectarian	  assassination	  are	  difficult	  to	  classify,	  making	  it	  impossible	  to	  create	  a	  precise	  statistical	  breakdown	  of	  sectarian	  assassinations	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  A	  Northern	  Ireland	  Office	  press	  notice	  on	  June	  11,	  1975	  states,	  	  “Secretary	  of	  State	  Mr.	  Merlyn	  Rees	  MP,	  was	  asked	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  today	  (11	  June)	  by	  Mr.	  A	  W	  Stallard	  what	  the	  security	  forces	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  have	  done	  to	  combat	  the	  problem	  of	  sectarian	  assassinations?	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  said	  in	  a	  written	  reply:	  Sectarian	  assassinations	  is	  a	  much	  abused	  term	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  It	  should	  be	  restricted	  to	  cases	  where	  this	  is	  knowledge,	  not	  just	  suspicion”13.	  	  	  Here,	  in	  a	  public	  forum,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  deflects	  questions	  about	  British	  policy	  by	  focusing	  on	  definitions	  of	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  He	  also	  attempts	  to	  convey	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  as	  concerning	  as	  it	  appears,	  because	  the	  terminology	  is	  exaggerated	  and	  overused.	  The	  report	  goes	  on	  to	  state	  that	  the	  British	  government	  could	  not	  provide	  accurate	  statistics	  on	  sectarian	  murders	  because	  many	  assassinations	  thought	  to	  be	  sectarian	  could	  in	  fact	  be	  interfactional	  (within	  the	  community)	  and	  it	  is	  incredibly	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  two	  until	  the	  case	  had	  cleared.	  According	  to	  information	  conveyed	  to	  the	  public,	  the	  British	  government	  could	  not	  fulfill	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland’s	  request	  to	  comment	  on,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Northern	  Ireland	  Office	  Press	  Notice.	  11	  June	  1975.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  27	  May	  2009).	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relay	  statistics	  concerning	  sectarian	  assassinations	  because	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  define	  and	  classify	  such	  crimes.	  	  	   Interestingly,	  documents	  between	  British	  officials	  reveal	  quite	  a	  different	  story.	  A	  letter	  between	  three	  British	  officials,	  Mr.	  Hill,	  Mr.	  Chesterton,	  and	  Mr.	  Webster	  dated	  July	  25,	  1975	  states,	  “The	  RUC	  keep	  statistics	  since	  the	  1	  January	  1972	  on	  ‘sectarian	  and	  interfactional	  assassinations’	  and	  since	  the	  1	  January	  1975	  on	  ‘sectarian	  and	  interfactional	  murders”14.	  This	  indicates	  that	  there	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  protocol	  in	  place	  to	  collect	  statistics	  that	  differentiate	  between	  sectarian	  and	  interfactional	  murders.	  The	  letter	  implies	  that	  the	  British	  government	  had	  statistics	  with	  the	  sectarian	  breakdown	  that	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland	  was	  looking	  for.	  This	  is	  confirmed	  in	  a	  report	  composed	  by	  B	  M	  Webster	  in	  August	  of	  1975.	  At	  the	  top,	  he	  indicates	  that	  he	  “would	  like	  to	  say	  again	  that	  this	  information	  is	  based	  on	  intelligence	  assessments	  and	  is	  therefore	  for	  internal	  consumption	  only15.	  The	  report	  goes	  on	  to	  reveal	  highly	  detailed	  statistics	  about	  sectarian	  vs.	  interfactional	  murders	  and	  what	  groups	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  murders	  within	  each	  sect.	  Mr.	  Webster’s	  report	  exposes	  that	  the	  British	  government	  did	  indeed	  have	  a	  very	  comprehensive	  and	  sophisticated	  idea	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  sectarian	  violence	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,	  supported	  by	  statistical	  evidence.	  It	  is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  these	  statistics	  were	  to	  remain	  amongst	  officials	  and	  out	  of	  the	  public	  eye.	  The	  contrast	  between	  what	  the	  British	  claimed	  they	  knew	  and	  what	  they	  had	  recorded	  reveals	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  D.	  A.	  Hill,	  Letter	  to	  Mr.	  Chesterton	  and	  Mr.	  Webster.	  25	  July	  1975.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  27	  May	  2009).	  	  	  15	  B.	  M.	  Webster,	  “Killings	  Since	  the	  Beginning	  of	  the	  Ceasefire”.	  August	  1975.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  27	  May	  2009).	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that	  the	  government	  must	  have	  found	  it	  highly	  disadvantageous	  to	  disclose	  all	  the	  information	  they	  had	  on	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  	   The	  question	  then	  becomes,	  why	  did	  the	  British	  government	  downplay	  what	  they	  knew	  in	  the	  face	  of	  international	  pressure?	  The	  reason	  provided	  by	  many	  officials	  in	  the	  declassified	  documents	  is	  that	  it	  would	  provoke	  greater	  loyalist	  violence.	  In	  a	  letter	  from	  Mr.	  Webster	  to	  Mr.	  Brown	  and	  Mr.	  Moyle	  on	  May	  23rd,	  1975,	  he	  writes	  that,	  “If	  we	  released	  sectarian	  statistics	  or	  condemned	  the	  murder	  of	  Catholics	  alone,	  they	  would	  be	  picked	  up	  by	  publications	  like	  “Loyalist	  News”	  and	  encourage	  perverted	  minds”16.	  Additionally,	  in	  a	  letter	  from	  Mr.	  Webster	  to	  Mr.	  Bampton	  on	  August	  8,	  1975,	  he	  argues	  that,	  “the	  publication	  of	  a	  sectarian	  breakdown	  might	  encourage	  one	  side	  or	  the	  other	  to	  increase	  its	  activities	  to	  prove	  that	  it	  is	  not	  ‘lagging	  behind’	  in	  ‘protecting’	  its	  own	  people	  against	  attacks	  form	  the	  opposing	  community”17.	  He	  seems	  to	  be	  concerned	  that	  publishing	  sectarian	  statistics	  could	  provoke	  either	  community	  to	  engage	  in	  revenge-­‐related	  violence.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  discussed	  with	  Paul	  O’Connor,	  this	  theory	  has	  received	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  skepticism,	  particularly	  amongst	  members	  of	  the	  community	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  those	  belonging	  to	  the	  community	  at	  the	  time	  that	  were	  willing	  to	  engage	  in	  revenge	  murders	  of	  their	  friends,	  relatives,	  colleagues	  and	  neighbors	  were	  already	  aware	  of	  the	  assassinations	  before	  they	  were	  published	  in	  any	  official	  government	  statistics.	  It	  is	  unclear	  within	  the	  documents	  if	  Britain’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  B.	  M.	  Webster.	  	  Letter	  to	  Mr.	  Brown	  and	  Mr.	  Moyle.	  23	  May	  1975.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  27	  May	  2009).	  	  	  17	  B.	  M.	  Webster.	  	  Letter	  to	  Mr.	  Bampton.	  8	  August	  1975.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  27	  May	  2009).	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concern	  is	  legitimate	  or	  rather	  an	  excuse	  to	  justify	  inaction	  towards	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  	  Another,	  perhaps	  more	  pessimistic,	  explanation	  for	  the	  British	  governments	  behavior	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  declassified	  documents.	  Various	  correspondences	  among	  officials	  indicated	  that	  the	  government	  feared	  for	  its	  international	  image	  after	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland	  received	  statistics.	  A	  letter	  from	  Mr.	  Janes	  to	  Mr.	  Harding	  on	  May	  22,	  1975	  states	  that	  the	  government	  was	  reluctant	  to	  pass	  any	  information	  over	  the	  Irish	  because,	  “it	  is	  too	  easily	  misinterpreted”18.	  	  Officials	  in	  the	  British	  government	  were	  concerned	  that	  statistics	  revealing	  a	  high	  number	  of	  assassinations	  of	  Catholics	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  British	  government	  was	  tolerating	  loyalist	  violence.	  A	  letter	  from	  D.	  J.	  Trevelyan	  dated	  on	  May	  28,	  1975	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  confirms	  this	  by	  arguing,	  	  “There	  is	  also	  no	  doubt	  that	  Dublin	  want	  the	  figures	  merely	  to	  try	  and	  cause	  us	  embarrassment:	  total	  figures	  show	  that	  the	  IRA	  are	  responsible	  for	  great	  majority	  of	  the	  deaths	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  but	  if	  the	  “Sectarian	  murders”	  can	  be	  separated	  out,	  then	  Dublin	  hope	  that	  it	  can	  be	  shown	  that	  loyalists	  are	  more	  responsible	  than	  the	  Republicans	  (although	  the	  latter	  are	  far	  from	  blameless)”19.	  	  	  The	  letter	  further	  indicates	  that	  the	  British	  were	  worried	  that	  the	  Irish	  would	  portray	  disproportionately	  high	  Catholic	  assassinations	  as	  the	  fault	  of	  the	  government,	  which	  the	  author	  admits	  would	  hurt	  Britain’s	  image	  internationally.	  As	  time	  progressed,	  British	  officials	  continued	  to	  refuse	  to	  disclose	  statistics.	  In	  a	  letter	  from	  Mr.	  Webster	  to	  Mr.	  Bampton	  on	  August	  8th,	  he	  argues	  that	  publicizing	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  J.	  W	  Janes.	  	  Letter	  to	  G.	  W	  Harding.	  22	  May	  1975.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  27	  May	  2009).	  	  19	  D.	  J.	  Trevelyan.	  Letter	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Merlyn	  Rees.	  28	  May	  1975.	  The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  27	  May	  2009.	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sectarian	  breakdown	  would	  provide	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  security	  forces	  were	  biased	  in	  handling	  the	  issue	  of	  assassinations.	  He	  also	  notes	  that,	  “a	  sectarian	  breakdown	  of	  a	  particular	  figure	  may	  be	  advantageous	  to	  the	  Government	  at	  the	  time	  of	  publication	  but	  at	  a	  later	  date	  may	  work	  against	  the	  policy	  we	  are	  pursing”20.	  This	  illustrates	  that	  the	  decision	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  release	  statistics	  was	  part	  of	  an	  overall	  government	  strategy	  to	  manipulate	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  Doing	  so	  would	  help	  cultivate	  a	  certain	  perception	  and	  storyline	  about	  its	  role.	  This	  information	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  British	  attitude	  and	  strategy	  towards	  sectarian	  assassinations	  in	  the	  early	  1970’s.	  While	  the	  government	  had	  very	  exact	  statistics	  it	  claimed	  to	  know	  much	  less	  than	  it	  did	  and	  discussed	  in	  secret	  that	  knowledge	  of	  these	  numbers	  would	  be	  very	  damaging	  to	  them.	  This	  does	  not	  automatically	  indicate	  that	  the	  British	  government	  was	  associated	  or	  outwardly	  tolerated	  loyalist	  paramilitary	  violence,	  but	  it	  does	  imply	  that	  the	  government	  felt	  insecure	  about	  confronting	  the	  situation.	  It	  reveals	  that	  some	  of	  what	  the	  British	  government	  publicly	  stated	  was	  in	  direct	  contradiction	  with	  the	  truth	  and	  that	  the	  British	  government	  was	  willing	  to	  lie	  to	  the	  international	  community	  to	  save	  its	  reputation.	  Finally,	  it	  shows	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  trend	  seen	  throughout	  this	  paper	  of	  the	  British	  government	  manipulating	  the	  story	  involving	  sectarian	  assassinations	  and	  avoiding	  it	  instead	  of	  directly	  handling	  the	  issue.	  	  	  
Who	  is	  to	  Blame?	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  B.	  M.	  Webster.	  	  Letter	  to	  Mr.	  Bampton.	  8	  August	  1975.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	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   In	  the	  conversation	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  sectarian	  violence,	  controversy	  also	  rose	  regarding	  who	  was	  to	  blame.	  According	  to	  the	  declassified	  documents,	  officials	  in	  the	  government	  for	  the	  most	  part	  acknowledged	  that	  loyalists	  primarily	  committed	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  	  In	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  draft	  letter	  by	  B	  M	  Webster,	  he	  states,	  “Waves	  of	  sectarian	  assassinations	  seem	  to	  start	  from	  the	  Protestant	  side.	  When	  Protestants	  feel	  threatened	  (particularly	  those	  in	  the	  poorer	  areas	  of	  East	  and	  North	  Belfast)	  they	  turn	  to	  a	  campaign	  of	  murder”21.	  	  He	  reiterates	  his	  point	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Mr.	  Bourn	  dated	  May	  9th,	  1975	  by	  noting,	  “Sectarian	  assassination	  has	  a	  loyalist	  spring.	  When	  the	  loyalists	  feel	  threatened,	  they	  turn	  to	  murder”22..	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  common	  knowledge	  within	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  British	  government	  that	  loyalists	  were	  largely	  responsible	  for	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  	  However,	  in	  public	  contexts,	  Britain	  did	  not	  always	  acknowledge	  this	  fact.	  In	  Mr.	  Jane’s	  previously	  mentioned	  notes	  on	  his	  meeting	  with	  Cardinal	  Conway,	  he	  writes	  that	  the	  Cardinal	  had	  criticized	  the	  British	  government	  of	  prosecuting	  far	  more	  Catholics	  than	  Protestants	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  sectarian	  violence.	  In	  the	  meeting,	  Mr.	  Janes	  replies	  by	  saying	  that	  the	  police	  service	  was	  responding	  excellently	  and	  that,	  “we	  were	  continuing	  to	  do	  so	  and	  had	  picked	  up	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  arms	  and	  rounds	  of	  ammunition	  about	  equally	  divided	  between	  Protestant	  and	  Catholic.	  I	  thought,	  however,	  that	  we	  had	  picked	  up	  rather	  more	  explosives	  from	  Catholic	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  B.M.	  Webster,	  Draft	  of	  letter	  to	  Grand	  Officer	  Commanding	  and	  Chief	  Constable.	  15	  May	  1975.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	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  Office.	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  M.	  Webster.	  Letter	  to	  Mr.	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  (The	  National	  Archives	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houses”23.	  Here,	  when	  publically	  under	  criticism	  from	  the	  international	  community,	  Mr.	  Janes	  attempts	  shift	  the	  discussion	  to	  portray	  that	  Protestants	  were	  the	  primary	  responsibility	  holders	  for	  sectarian	  violence.	  He	  even	  implies	  that	  the	  Catholic	  community	  was	  more	  to	  blame.	  This	  illustrates	  another	  example	  of	  where	  the	  British	  government	  contradicted	  what	  it	  knew	  privately	  with	  false	  public	  statements.	  Instead	  of	  tackling	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  international	  realm,	  government	  officials	  tweaked	  the	  public	  story.	  By	  diverting	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  issue	  of	  overwhelming	  loyalist	  sectarian	  murders,	  the	  government	  hoped	  to	  dodge	  any	  conversations	  that	  would	  incriminate	  them	  by	  suggesting	  tolerance	  or	  even	  encouragement	  of	  loyalist	  paramilitary	  action.	  	  	  
Assessing	  the	  Status	  Quo	  In	  the	  face	  of	  international	  pressure,	  Britain	  was	  forced	  to	  go	  beyond	  simply	  defining	  and	  qualifying	  sectarian	  violence.	  The	  declassified	  documents	  reveal	  several	  correspondences	  that	  discuss	  the	  security	  forces’	  current	  responses	  to	  sectarian	  violence	  and	  their	  success.	  Within	  these	  documents	  I	  found	  further	  contradictions	  and	  discontinuities.	  In	  public	  interactions,	  particularly	  regarding	  the	  international	  community,	  British	  officials	  insisted	  that	  the	  security	  responses	  were	  up	  to	  par.	  This	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  letter	  from	  J	  D	  W	  Janes	  discussing	  his	  meeting	  with	  the	  Irish	  ambassador	  after	  the	  he	  criticizes	  Mr.	  Janes	  for	  Britain’s	  inactivity	  in	  the	  face	  of	  sectarian	  murders.	  Mr.	  Janes	  writes,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  J.W.	  Janes.,	  Letter	  to	  G.	  W.	  Harding.	  18	  April	  1975.	  (The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Found	  24	  June	  2009).	  	  
22	  
“There	  were	  no	  grounds	  for	  saying	  that	  we	  were	  being	  inactive.	  We	  had	  indeed	  increased	  the	  Arm	  patrolling	  on	  the	  interface	  between	  Catholic	  and	  Protestant	  areas	  and	  this	  had	  led	  to	  protests	  from	  the	  IRA	  that	  we	  were	  breaking	  the	  ceasefire”24.	  	  	  Publically,	  he	  denies	  any	  weaknesses	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  security	  forces,	  blaming	  the	  violence	  on	  an	  IRA	  response	  to	  increased	  police	  activity.	  Additionally,	  in	  a	  draft	  of	  letter	  from	  J	  Hickman	  sent	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland,	  he	  includes	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  brief	  on	  sectarian	  murders	  used	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  in	  his	  talk	  with	  the	  Irish	  Foreign	  Minister	  in	  Dublin	  on	  April	  19th,	  197525.	  The	  brief	  provides	  statistics	  to	  argue	  that	  both	  detention	  and	  conviction	  rates	  steadily	  rose	  from	  1969	  to	  1975.	  In	  these	  two	  documents,	  the	  British	  government	  defends	  the	  success	  of	  the	  security	  forces.	  Both	  involve	  public	  correspondences	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland,	  who	  had	  been	  previously	  accusing	  Britain	  of	  tolerating	  and	  have	  inadequate	  responses	  to	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  These	  letters	  suggest	  that	  it	  was	  the	  British	  government’s	  strategy	  to	  convey	  publically	  that	  the	  security	  situation	  involving	  sectarian	  murders	  was	  well	  handled	  and	  under	  control.	  The	  government	  seems	  unwilling	  to	  concede	  any	  sign	  of	  weakness	  on	  the	  issue,	  particularly	  to	  their	  critics.	  	  	   That	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  weaknesses	  did	  not	  exist.	  In	  fact,	  the	  primary	  sources	  I	  examined	  suggested	  multiple	  instances	  of	  doubt	  regarding	  the	  security	  forces’	  ability	  to	  combat	  sectarian	  violence.	  A	  UK	  Eyes	  Only	  document	  containing	  notes	  for	  the	  record	  done	  by	  P	  Haulmann	  on	  May	  29th,	  1975	  illustrates	  these	  concerns.	  The	  notes	  record	  the	  discussions	  during	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	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Secretary	  of	  State	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  with	  several	  prominent	  British	  officials.	  In	  the	  meeting,	  those	  present	  concluded	  that,	  	  “the	  RUC	  were	  hampered	  in	  dealing	  with	  sectarian	  assassinations	  by	  the	  shortage	  of	  CID	  staff;	  fears	  about	  their	  own	  safety	  if	  they	  pressed	  their	  enquiries	  too	  vigorously	  in	  hard	  loyalist	  areas;	  the	  inadequate	  degree	  of	  interchange	  of	  information	  between	  the	  CID	  and	  the	  Special	  Branch;	  and	  the	  greater	  constraints	  which	  the	  Courts	  and	  the	  CPP	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  placed	  on	  the	  Police	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  preparation	  and	  treatment	  of	  offenders”26.	  	  	  This	  is	  as	  particularly	  telling	  document	  for	  a	  few	  reasons.	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  involves	  high	  ranking	  individuals	  that	  would	  have	  the	  power	  and	  be	  responsible	  for	  making	  overarching	  decisions	  regarding	  strategy	  of	  security	  forces.	  If	  deficiencies	  in	  RUC	  capability	  came	  to	  their	  attention,	  they	  were	  likely	  credible	  concerns.	  Additionally,	  the	  document	  is	  labeled	  “UK	  Eyes	  Only”,	  meaning	  it	  would	  only	  have	  been	  shared	  amongst	  members	  in	  the	  British	  government	  and	  would	  be	  secret	  ever	  to	  officials	  of	  the	  RUC.	  Finally,	  it	  lists	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  barriers	  to	  RUC	  success	  in	  combating	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  Some	  of	  them	  are	  resource	  based,	  such	  as	  staff	  shortages,	  while	  some	  were	  structural,	  such	  as	  legal	  and	  communication	  barriers.	  Finally,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  interestingly,	  some	  were	  social.	  The	  document	  indicates	  that	  the	  RUC	  was	  unsuccessful	  in	  deterring	  sectarian	  assassinations	  because	  they	  were	  worried	  about	  blowback	  from	  loyalist	  areas.	  This	  means	  that	  prominent	  government	  officials	  were	  acknowledging	  that	  to	  some	  degree	  loyalist	  paramilitaries	  had	  enough	  influence	  to	  convince	  the	  RUC	  not	  to	  investigate	  or	  prosecute	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  	  This	  is	  a	  strong	  diversion	  from	  the	  public	  message	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	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Ireland	  that	  security	  forces	  were	  highly	  successful	  in	  tackling	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  These	  findings	  contribute	  to	  an	  overall	  pattern	  seen	  in	  these	  declassified	  documents.	  The	  British	  government	  continuously	  presented	  an	  oversimplified,	  rosier	  picture	  of	  the	  events	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  in	  the	  public	  realm	  that	  hid	  unsavory	  aspects	  of	  their	  strategies	  and	  shortcomings.	  	  	   	  
Searching	  for	  Solutions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  contradictions	  I	  found	  regarding	  solutions	  to	  sectarian	  violence	  differ	  from	  previous	  patterns,	  but	  are	  perhaps	  even	  more	  concerning.	  	  Just	  as	  amongst	  themselves	  British	  officials	  thought	  Protestants	  were	  largely	  responsible	  for	  sectarian	  assassinations,	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  consensus	  that	  any	  policy	  to	  stop	  sectarian	  assassinations	  must	  be	  directed	  at	  loyalists	  as	  well.	  In	  Mr.	  Webster’s	  letter	  to	  Mr.	  Bourn	  dated	  May	  9,	  1975	  he	  adds	  at	  the	  end,	  	  “The	  RUC	  must	  know	  and	  understand	  these	  people.	  Policing	  of	  the	  ‘difficult’	  Protestant	  areas	  is	  the	  key	  to	  this	  problem	  and	  they	  must	  tackle	  it.	  I	  am	  sure	  that	  this	  is	  where	  our	  effort	  in	  this	  field	  must	  be	  concentrated.	  The	  green	  areas	  are	  of	  secondary	  consideration	  by	  comparison”27.	  	  	  Here	  Mr.	  Webster	  explicitly	  states	  that	  dealing	  with	  the	  loyalist	  community	  must	  be	  prioritized	  over	  the	  nationalist	  community.	  In	  a	  letter	  from	  Sir	  Frank	  Cooper	  to	  Lt	  Gen	  Sir	  Frank	  King	  dated	  May	  15,	  1975,	  he	  states	  that	  the	  Protestant	  community	  is	  the	  source	  for	  most	  sectarian	  murders.	  He	  notes	  that,	  “The	  major	  problem	  that	  we	  face	  is	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  springs	  of	  violence	  at	  their	  source,	  to	  secure	  the	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rejection	  of	  violence	  by	  their	  communities	  and	  to	  gain	  their	  greater	  assistance	  in	  enforcing	  the	  law”28.	  In	  order	  to	  truly	  make	  an	  impact,	  Mr.	  Cooper	  argues	  that	  the	  issue	  must	  be	  addressed	  at	  its	  root	  cause,	  which	  he	  believes	  to	  be	  the	  loyalist	  community.	  The	  declassified	  documents	  that	  those	  informed	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  within	  the	  British	  government	  all	  advocated	  for	  policies	  that	  directly	  targeted	  loyalists	  in	  order	  to	  curb	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  	  One	  solution	  instigated	  by	  the	  British	  government	  to	  curb	  sectarian	  assassinations	  and	  other	  violence	  was	  to	  increase	  the	  amount	  of	  screenings	  to	  catch	  suspicious	  personnel	  that	  may	  have	  been	  responsible	  for	  or	  may	  in	  the	  future	  commit	  sectarian	  violence.	  The	  British	  kept	  record	  of	  such	  violence,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  The	  statistics	  collected	  are	  immediately	  very	  puzzling.	  In	  the	  time	  period	  from	  January	  1st	  to	  March	  22nd	  in	  1976,	  30	  shootings	  and	  37	  bombings	  were	  apparently	  carried	  out	  by	  what	  the	  British	  refer	  to	  as	  “Protestant	  extremists”	  and	  “Catholic	  extremists”	  carried	  out	  20	  shootings	  and	  34	  bombings.	  This	  means	  that,	  according	  to	  these	  statistics,	  during	  these	  three	  months	  Protestants	  were	  more	  responsible	  for	  sectarian	  violence,	  though	  the	  numbers	  are	  relatively	  similar.	  However,	  the	  same	  document	  indicates	  that	  from	  September	  1975	  to	  March	  of	  1976,	  1,876	  Catholics	  were	  screened	  and	  118	  Protestants	  were	  screened.	  This	  means	  that	  of	  the	  people	  screened,	  94%	  of	  them	  were	  Catholic	  though	  Catholics	  were	  only	  responsible	  for	  40%	  of	  the	  shootings	  and	  48%	  of	  the	  bombings.	  Findings	  from	  other	  time	  periods	  show	  similar	  patterns.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  these	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statistics	  occurred	  simply	  by	  chance.	  To	  create	  such	  discrepancies	  there	  was	  likely	  inequalities	  in	  the	  ways	  the	  security	  forces	  carried	  out	  the	  screenings.	  Even	  when	  just	  looking	  at	  screenings	  for	  March	  of	  1976,	  63	  Catholics	  were	  screened	  and	  2	  Protestants	  were	  screened.	  The	  document	  states	  that	  9	  were	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  RUC.	  While	  it	  does	  not	  indicate	  which	  of	  the	  9	  were	  Catholic	  and	  Protestant,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  from	  the	  screening	  statistics	  that	  more	  Catholics	  were	  handed	  over	  than	  Protestants.	  	  These	  findings,	  however,	  only	  show	  the	  end	  result.	  They	  do	  not	  indicate	  at	  what	  level	  were	  orders	  or	  policies	  created	  to	  cause	  these	  results	  and	  thus	  blame	  cannot	  be	  placed	  definitively	  on	  any	  singular	  party.	  However,	  these	  results	  do	  indicate	  a	  few	  key	  pieces	  of	  information.	  First,	  inequalities	  in	  screenings	  and	  arrests	  have	  evidentiary	  support,	  and	  are	  not	  just	  legends	  or	  opinions	  of	  the	  Catholic	  community.	  Second,	  the	  government	  acknowledged	  that	  dealing	  with	  loyalists	  was	  the	  solution	  to	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  Yet	  at	  the	  implementation	  level,	  at	  least	  when	  it	  came	  to	  screenings,	  nothing	  was	  done	  to	  seriously	  target	  loyalists	  and	  discrimination	  towards	  Catholic	  seems	  to	  prevail.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  contradictions	  in	  British	  government	  attitudes	  moved	  beyond	  diplomatic	  rhetoric	  and	  affected	  how	  the	  situation	  was	  dealt	  with	  on	  the	  ground	  level.	  Finally,	  consistent	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  paper,	  no	  declassified	  documents	  provide	  a	  direct	  order	  to	  perpetuate	  loyalist-­‐led	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  However,	  the	  generally	  slack	  attitude	  towards	  arresting	  loyalists,	  even	  when	  they	  were	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  the	  problem,	  seemed	  to	  have	  that	  result.	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Contextualizing	  the	  Research:	  
Immersed	  Amongst	  Activism:	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  my	  research,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  profound	  impact	  that	  my	  environment	  played	  in	  motivating	  and	  shaping	  my	  project.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  previously,	  I	  conducted	  my	  research	  in	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  in	  Derry.	  The	  context	  of	  my	  research	  was	  one	  of	  intense	  activism	  instead	  of	  academic	  impartiality.	  My	  idea	  for	  the	  project	  grew	  from	  discussions	  with	  Paul	  O’Connor,	  who	  is	  highly	  active	  in	  exposing	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  British	  government	  collusion	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  Mr.	  O’Connor	  is	  passionate	  about	  highlighting	  injustices	  that	  negatively	  affected	  his	  community	  during	  the	  Troubles.	  He	  has	  done	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  research	  using	  declassified	  documents,	  particularly	  to	  expose	  British	  attitudes	  and	  connections	  to	  loyalist	  paramilitaries	  through	  the	  UDR.	  He	  gave	  me	  background	  information	  on	  atrocities	  committed	  by	  loyalist	  paramilitaries	  in	  the	  1970’s	  and	  examples	  of	  government	  injustices	  that	  occurred.	  More	  of	  our	  conversations	  surrounded	  these	  issues	  than	  any	  other	  aspect	  of	  the	  conflict.	  In	  addition	  to	  helping	  me	  with	  my	  initial	  project	  direction,	  our	  discussions	  sparked	  ideas	  of	  British	  strategies	  and	  motives	  to	  look	  for	  when	  I	  did	  my	  research.	  Mr.	  O’Connor	  and	  his	  colleagues	  also	  selected	  the	  articles	  I	  had	  access	  to	  from	  the	  national	  archives	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  exposing	  injustices	  committed	  by	  the	  British	  government.	  I	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  every	  document	  issued	  during	  the	  time	  period	  I	  studied,	  only	  those	  selected	  by	  Mr.	  O’Connor.	  Thus	  my	  work	  did	  not	  start	  from	  an	  objective	  collection	  of	  research	  done	  by	  impartial	  academics.	  I	  acknowledge	  that,	  while	  the	  information	  I	  gathered	  was	  not	  inaccurate,	  the	  material	  chosen	  and	  the	  
28	  
conversations	  that	  motivated	  and	  guided	  my	  research	  came	  from	  sources	  with	  activist	  goals.	  As	  a	  result,	  not	  all	  perspectives	  and	  issues	  are	  equally	  raised	  in	  my	  work.	  	  Beyond	  the	  advice	  I	  received	  for	  my	  work,	  the	  places	  and	  people	  I	  interacted	  with	  influenced	  my	  research.	  Simply	  doing	  research	  in	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center,	  surrounded	  by	  activity	  and	  materials	  for	  work	  on	  human	  rights	  abuses,	  undoubtedly	  influenced	  my	  way	  of	  thinking.	  I	  was	  working	  amongst	  people	  who	  are	  deeply	  angered	  by	  injustices	  during	  the	  Troubles	  and	  had	  been	  or	  knew	  people	  that	  were	  personally	  victimized	  by	  the	  conflict.	  Through	  observing	  the	  center,	  I	  saw	  the	  strategies	  and	  challenges	  to	  fighting	  these	  injustices.	  I	  believe	  being	  immersed	  in	  such	  an	  environment	  led	  me	  take	  my	  paper	  in	  the	  direction	  I	  did.	  I	  became	  motivated	  to	  be	  critical	  of	  the	  mainstream	  telling	  of	  history	  and	  to	  look	  for	  clues	  that	  might	  unearth	  a	  different	  perspective.	  Additionally,	  talking	  to	  my	  host	  family	  in	  Derry,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  staff	  members	  of	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  who	  grew	  up	  on	  Derry,	  gave	  me	  a	  better	  idea	  of	  the	  conventional	  understandings	  and	  assumptions	  of	  the	  people	  in	  the	  community.	  I	  found	  myself	  taking	  those	  assumptions	  and	  trying	  to	  substantiate	  them	  with	  evidence	  from	  primary	  sources.	  I	  also	  found	  that	  the	  more	  I	  spent	  time	  in	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  center,	  the	  more	  invested	  I	  became	  in	  the	  issues	  I	  was	  studying.	  Those	  that	  work	  with	  the	  center	  are	  not	  just	  interested	  in	  an	  academic	  topic.	  They	  are	  passionately	  working	  on	  issues	  that	  resonate	  deeply	  with	  themselves	  and	  their	  community.	  I	  find	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  engross	  oneself	  in	  such	  a	  space,	  even	  for	  only	  three	  weeks,	  without	  taking	  on	  a	  similar	  spirit	  and	  goals	  to	  some	  extent.	  I	  am	  aware,	  however,	  that	  the	  perspectives	  and	  stories	  I	  heard	  are	  not	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a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  what	  occurred	  during	  the	  conflict	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,	  and	  therefore	  the	  mindset	  I	  carried	  with	  me	  into	  constructing	  these	  arguments	  is	  not	  completely	  impartial.	  	  
	  
A	  Utilitarian	  Purpose	  	   I	  do	  not	  see	  the	  lack	  of	  complete	  objectivity	  in	  my	  work	  as	  shortcoming,	  however.	  In	  fact,	  I	  believe	  it	  uniquely	  enhances	  the	  research	  for	  a	  few	  reasons.	  First,	  activists	  are	  often	  inspired	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  conventional	  knowledge	  to	  prove	  an	  argument.	  With	  a	  specific	  goal	  in	  mind,	  or	  cause	  to	  promote,	  I	  found	  that	  researchers	  are	  more	  willing	  to	  go	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  acquire	  the	  necessary	  materials.	  A	  goal	  of	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  is	  to	  expose	  British	  government	  collusion	  and	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  This	  goal	  sparks	  the	  desire	  to	  painstakingly	  search	  through	  the	  National	  Archives	  to	  find	  relevant	  information.	  It	  pushes	  researchers	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  existing	  knowledge	  and	  search	  for	  clues	  that	  might	  challenge	  that	  and	  help	  their	  cause.	  I	  believe	  I	  embodied	  that	  spirit	  while	  picking	  through	  documents	  to	  find	  evidence	  of	  certain	  attitudes	  or	  ideas	  in	  the	  writings.	  	  I	  believe	  that	  to	  gain	  new,	  valuable	  research,	  one	  cannot	  rely	  simply	  on	  the	  impartiality	  of	  academia.	  The	  determination	  and	  drive	  of	  activists	  often	  is	  the	  necessary	  component	  to	  find	  new	  ideas,	  clues,	  and	  perspectives	  that	  make	  the	  collective	  knowledge	  of	  a	  topic	  richer	  and	  more	  comprehensive.	  	  	   Additionally,	  research	  done	  by	  activists	  often	  has	  more	  relevant	  application	  to	  the	  people	  the	  information	  actually	  affects.	  I	  think	  it	  is	  a	  detriment	  to	  academia	  that	  it	  can	  often	  get	  trapped	  within	  an	  ivory	  tower.	  Academics	  write	  for	  other	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academics,	  burdening	  their	  research	  with	  extra	  tweaks	  and	  stipulations	  in	  order	  to	  be	  precise	  and	  avoid	  criticism	  for	  generalizing	  or	  assuming	  too	  much.	  However,	  I	  find,	  and	  also	  discussed	  with	  Paul	  O’Connor,	  that	  these	  works	  often	  go	  unseen.	  The	  research	  done	  has	  little	  power	  to	  incite	  political	  change	  or	  provide	  any	  kind	  of	  impact	  of	  the	  people	  of	  a	  community.	  Activists	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  tend	  to	  know	  what	  issues	  are	  important	  to	  the	  community	  and	  often	  do	  research	  related	  to	  those	  topics.	  They	  utilize	  their	  research	  to	  push	  for	  political	  change	  in	  their	  communities	  and	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  seen	  by	  the	  communities.	  Sometimes,	  simply	  being	  able	  to	  support	  claims	  with	  concrete	  evidence	  is	  very	  useful	  to	  communities	  where	  these	  claims	  are	  considered	  just	  speculation.	  For	  example,	  those	  who	  suspected	  that	  security	  forces	  were	  involved	  in	  a	  sectarian	  attack	  of	  a	  family	  member	  would	  very	  much	  appreciate	  evidence	  that	  indicated	  that	  the	  British	  government	  participated	  in	  collusion.	  Presenting	  findings	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  understandable	  and	  visible	  to	  everyday	  people	  can	  give	  research	  that	  would	  otherwise	  stay	  amongst	  academics	  a	  utilitarian	  purpose.	  	  Writing	  in	  a	  more	  activist	  context	  is	  also	  less	  concerned	  with	  subtlety	  in	  language.	  The	  writing	  style	  tends	  to	  have	  more	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  impact,	  which	  generates	  more	  emotions	  and	  in	  my	  opinion	  is	  more	  powerful	  in	  generating	  awareness	  and	  promoting	  a	  cause.	  For	  example,	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  works	  with	  people	  who	  had	  family	  members	  killed	  by	  loyalist	  paramilitaries.	  Thus	  when	  the	  center	  is	  involved	  in	  conducting	  research	  and	  writing,	  they	  do	  it	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  those	  families	  in	  mind,	  not	  other	  academics.	  Their	  writing	  tends	  to	  be	  more	  attention	  grabbing,	  and	  is	  distributed	  to	  the	  communities	  and	  to	  those	  capable	  of	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enacting	  political	  change.	  In	  order	  to	  overcome	  a	  dominant	  political	  narrative,	  I	  think	  that	  activists	  paint	  their	  arguments	  in	  bolder,	  broader	  strokes	  that	  challenge	  existing	  notions	  instead	  of	  chipping	  away	  and	  tweaking	  them,	  like	  is	  often	  done	  amongst	  academics.	  Ultimately,	  it	  can	  be	  a	  waste	  to	  let	  research	  remain	  amongst	  elitists	  and	  serve	  no	  benefit	  to	  the	  people	  it	  concerns.	  Being	  able	  to	  use	  evidence	  to	  help	  communities	  enact	  change	  I	  believe	  is	  an	  undervalued	  goal	  in	  academic	  research.	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  truth	  recovery	  can	  be	  a	  very	  healing	  aspect	  for	  communities	  and	  individuals.	  Families	  receive	  a	  sense	  of	  closure	  and	  justice	  when	  their	  views	  of	  events	  are	  acknowledged,	  especially	  when	  they	  had	  been	  ignored	  or	  quieted	  for	  decades.	  Communities	  are	  better	  able	  to	  move	  forwards	  and	  trust	  new	  regimes	  and	  institutions	  when	  they	  feel	  that	  their	  positions	  have	  been	  legitimized29.	  While	  the	  casework	  done	  by	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  center	  is	  healing	  for	  individuals	  and	  families.	  Academic	  research	  like	  mine	  can	  function	  the	  same	  way	  on	  a	  larger	  scale.	  Acknowledgement	  of	  British	  failings	  and	  shortcomings,	  especially	  when	  it	  came	  to	  murders	  of	  community	  members	  gives	  legitimacy	  to	  what	  I	  gathered	  to	  be	  a	  commonplace	  notion.	  The	  more	  this	  research	  is	  conducted,	  the	  stronger	  the	  counter-­‐narrative	  will	  be	  to	  the	  British	  claims	  that	  they	  did	  everything	  in	  their	  power	  to	  stop	  the	  violence.	  A	  strongly	  supported	  argument,	  particularly	  based	  in	  primary	  sources,	  is	  both	  satisfying	  for	  the	  community	  and	  may	  even	  promote	  recognition	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  British	  government.	  Movements	  that	  acknowledge	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Dealing	  With	  the	  Past.	  Commission	  for	  Victims	  and	  Survivors,	  June	  2010.	  Web.	  3	  Dec.	  2012.	  <http://www.cvsni.org/images/stories/dealing_past/dealing_with_the_past_final_28.06.10.pdf>. 	  
32	  
past	  I	  think	  are	  highly	  beneficial	  for	  groups	  of	  people	  to	  trust	  governments	  again	  and	  move	  forward.	  	  Finally,	  I	  think	  my	  research	  reflects	  the	  unique	  position	  I	  had	  in	  conducting	  my	  research.	  I	  was	  both	  a	  participant	  and	  an	  observer.	  I	  was	  an	  outsider	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  did	  not	  work	  as	  an	  activist	  and	  was	  from	  another	  country.	  Yet,	  I	  was	  immersed	  in	  the	  center,	  which	  I	  acknowledge	  impacted	  the	  perspectives	  in	  my	  writing.	  My	  writing	  reflects	  these	  two	  forces.	  I	  think	  while	  objective	  academia	  and	  activist	  writing	  both	  have	  their	  place,	  more	  consideration	  should	  be	  placed	  on	  work	  that	  straddles	  the	  two	  camps.	  I	  think	  I	  was	  able	  to	  have	  an	  open	  mind	  in	  my	  research	  due	  to	  my	  objectivity	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  activist	  influences	  pushed	  me	  to	  look	  at	  unconventional	  sources	  to	  find	  patterns	  and	  draw	  conclusions.	  Because	  I	  was	  involved	  in	  a	  more	  grassroots	  organization,	  I	  could	  see	  how	  research	  like	  mine	  could	  be	  seen	  and	  appreciated	  by	  the	  community.	  While	  the	  British	  attitudes	  in	  the	  1970’s	  may	  be	  considered	  common	  knowledge	  to	  people,	  using	  their	  own	  documents	  to	  support	  some	  skepticism	  held	  by	  communities	  like	  those	  in	  Derry	  could	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  process	  of	  transitional	  justice	  there.	  My	  writing	  could	  take	  on	  some	  of	  the	  advantages	  the	  activist	  writing	  without	  perhaps	  committing	  to	  one	  political	  camp.	  Seeing	  the	  value	  that	  a	  grassroots	  utilitarian	  purpose	  gives	  to	  writing,	  I	  think	  that	  more	  academics	  should	  immerse	  themselves	  in	  the	  communities	  they	  study	  and	  present	  a	  more	  nuanced	  participant-­‐observer	  approach.	  	  	  
Personal	  Reflection	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   Throughout	  my	  project	  I	  kept	  notes	  on	  my	  personal	  reactions	  and	  growth	  as	  I	  did	  my	  research.	  I	  found	  analyzing	  primary	  documents	  to	  be	  a	  very	  challenging,	  yet	  rewarding	  process.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  research	  I	  conducted	  was	  a	  broader	  and	  lower-­‐stakes	  of	  the	  work	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  does,	  and	  even	  the	  work	  the	  solicitor	  Pat	  Finucane	  did.	  It	  involves	  beginning	  with	  a	  notion	  stated	  to	  be	  true	  by	  a	  government	  body	  or	  perhaps	  even	  an	  issue	  where	  no	  answers	  currently	  exist.	  Then,	  you	  must	  go	  through	  vast	  amounts	  of	  information,	  must	  of	  it	  irrelevant,	  to	  locate	  relevant	  details	  and	  start	  to	  put	  together	  patterns	  and	  trends.	  This	  can	  be	  challenging	  because	  it	  requires	  a	  significant	  patience	  and	  interpretation.	  I	  thought	  of	  how	  those	  investigating	  government	  actions	  during	  the	  Troubles	  must	  have	  had	  an	  even	  more	  difficult	  time,	  as	  the	  information	  was	  even	  more	  confidential	  and	  difficult	  to	  gather.	  Often,	  it	  does	  not	  take	  the	  direction	  you	  expect	  it	  to,	  but	  allowing	  the	  information	  to	  create	  its	  own	  complex	  picture	  of	  reality,	  and	  not	  manipulating	  it	  for	  your	  own	  goals,	  is	  incredibly	  important.	  	   Additionally,	  integrating	  the	  research	  into	  written	  work	  was	  surprisingly	  challenging.	  On	  one	  hand,	  I	  wanted	  to	  continuously	  acknowledge	  the	  limitations	  of	  my	  research.	  My	  evidence	  is	  not	  a	  comprehensive	  collection	  of	  all	  perspectives	  on	  the	  issue	  and	  the	  activist	  environment	  I	  worked	  in	  influenced	  the	  direction	  I	  took	  in	  my	  paper.	  I	  needed	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  these	  broader	  interpretations	  I	  make	  are	  a	  product	  of	  this	  limited	  method	  of	  collecting	  evidence.	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  I	  found	  it	  easy	  to	  overwhelm	  my	  claims	  with	  academic	  qualifications	  and	  stipulations,	  leaving	  my	  conclusions	  seeming	  incredibly	  insignificant.	  As	  I	  mention	  earlier,	  I	  believe	  that	  even	  if	  a	  body	  of	  research	  cannot	  encapsulate	  all	  facts	  and	  positions,	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substantiating	  any	  claim	  or	  thought	  within	  a	  community	  with	  evidence	  can	  still	  be	  very	  beneficial.	  This	  especially	  true	  when	  the	  claim	  traditionally	  was	  silenced	  by	  a	  more	  dominant	  narrative.	  On	  some	  level,	  evidence	  like	  mine	  may	  be	  healing	  to	  these	  previously	  silenced	  communities	  and	  I	  would	  not	  want	  to	  detract	  from	  that	  by	  focusing	  solely	  on	  the	  limitations	  of	  my	  research.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  found	  striking	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  objective	  academic	  goals	  and	  utilitarian	  activist	  goals	  of	  this	  project	  very	  difficult.	  I	  can	  see	  how	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  for	  researchers	  to	  bring	  their	  work	  out	  of	  academia	  while	  keeping	  their	  language	  precise	  and	  free	  of	  over-­‐exaggeration	  or	  politicization.	  	  	   I	  found	  doing	  this	  kind	  of	  research	  incredibly	  rewarding,	  however.	  First,	  having	  to	  make	  my	  own	  interpretations	  and	  conclusions	  taught	  me	  a	  greater	  deal	  about	  the	  topic.	  It	  was	  much	  more	  satisfying	  to	  come	  to	  my	  own	  conclusions	  instead	  of	  simply	  basing	  ideas	  off	  of	  work	  previously	  done	  by	  academics.	  I	  also	  feel	  that	  since	  I	  used	  primary	  documents,	  many	  of	  which	  have	  not	  been	  used	  in	  academic	  papers	  (to	  my	  knowledge),	  my	  work	  contributes	  to	  a	  constantly	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  about	  the	  British	  government’s	  behavior	  during	  the	  Troubles.	  Working	  in	  Derry	  at	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  made	  me	  interact	  with	  people	  who	  feel	  very	  strongly	  about	  these	  issues	  and	  whose	  families	  and	  communities	  are	  connected	  with	  them.	  Even	  though	  I	  am	  not	  from	  Northern	  Ireland,	  having	  worked	  so	  closely	  with	  people	  who	  are,	  and	  having	  been	  able	  to	  create	  research	  that	  even	  in	  the	  smallest	  way	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  collection	  of	  knowledge	  that	  helps	  them,	  is	  very	  rewarding	  to	  me.	  Being	  able	  to	  immerse	  myself	  with	  people	  and	  places	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  my	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research	  I	  think	  not	  only	  enhanced	  the	  quality	  of	  my	  work	  but	  also	  helped	  it	  resonate	  with	  me	  on	  a	  personal	  level.	  
	   Beyond	  my	  research,	  I	  gathered	  new	  perspectives	  from	  simply	  observing	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  and	  staying	  in	  Derry.	  Being	  able	  to	  talk	  about	  issues	  with	  people	  who	  are	  passionate	  about	  them,	  like	  Paul	  O’Connor,	  enhanced	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  conflict	  a	  great	  deal.	  I	  not	  only	  learned	  about	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  Troubles,	  but	  how	  the	  issues	  are	  still	  being	  dealt	  with	  today	  in	  organizations	  like	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center	  as	  well.	  I	  understand	  more	  about	  truth	  recovery	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  impactful	  results	  a	  strong	  desire	  to	  uncover	  the	  truth	  can	  yield.	  Truth	  recovery	  can	  be	  difficult	  and	  there	  are	  many	  obstacles	  to	  overcome	  but	  I	  think	  that	  it	  is	  life	  changing	  to	  individuals	  and	  their	  communities	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	  a	  student	  interested	  in	  studying	  law	  and	  human	  rights,	  observing	  the	  impact	  that	  investigations	  and	  uncovering	  the	  truth	  can	  make	  was	  inspiring	  to	  me.	  I	  believe	  the	  lessons	  I	  have	  gathered	  during	  my	  independent	  study	  experience	  transcend	  the	  work	  of	  this	  project	  and	  will	  have	  a	  long-­‐lasting	  relevance	  in	  my	  life.	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  	   At	  first	  glance,	  there	  is	  no	  smoking	  gun	  in	  the	  declassified	  British	  government	  documents.	  Without	  a	  glaring	  case	  of	  collusion	  or	  corruption,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  believe	  the	  British	  government’s	  account	  of	  sectarian	  violence	  during	  the	  Troubles	  at	  face	  value.	  However,	  upon	  examining	  elements	  of	  documents	  like	  those	  at	  the	  Pat	  Finucane	  Center,	  small	  details	  form	  into	  larger	  patterns	  that	  provide	  a	  more	  complex	  counter-­‐narrative	  that	  questions	  and	  complicates	  the	  typical	  history.	  In	  my	  research	  I	  found	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that	  the	  British	  government	  was	  under	  severe	  pressure	  by	  1975	  to	  answer	  concerns	  from	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland	  and	  provide	  statistics	  on	  sectarian	  assassinations.	  Publicly,	  Britain	  claimed	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  statistics	  and	  that	  sectarian	  assassinations	  were	  difficult	  to	  define	  when	  the	  documents	  suggest	  that	  concrete	  and	  specific	  statistics	  existed.	  The	  government	  claimed	  publicly	  that	  the	  problem	  was	  not	  one-­‐sided	  and	  that	  the	  security	  forces	  were	  extremely	  capable	  of	  handling	  it	  while	  British	  officials	  in	  classified	  documents	  admitted	  that	  sectarian	  assassinations	  were	  loyalist-­‐led	  and	  spiraling	  out	  of	  control.	  Despite	  expressing	  these	  concerns,	  increasing	  screening	  tactics	  simply	  targeted	  more	  Catholics.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  none	  of	  this	  evidence	  declaratively	  states	  that	  the	  British	  tolerated	  loyalist	  paramilitary	  violence.	  However,	  it	  chips	  away	  at	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  British	  government	  honestly	  did	  everything	  in	  its	  power	  to	  combat	  the	  problem.	  The	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  the	  British	  strategy	  towards	  sectarian	  assassinations	  was	  not	  to	  attack	  the	  problem	  with	  all	  the	  resources	  and	  knowledge	  they	  had.	  Instead,	  the	  government	  relied	  on	  deceit,	  avoidance,	  and	  manipulation	  of	  facts	  to	  tackling	  the	  issue.	  	  	   While	  my	  findings	  may	  not	  be	  found	  in	  headlines,	  they	  have	  an	  important	  and	  unique	  place	  in	  Northern	  Ireland’s	  post-­‐conflict	  transformation.	  They	  take	  the	  commonplace	  notion	  that	  the	  British	  government	  did	  not	  do	  everything	  it	  could	  to	  stop	  murders	  of	  nationalists	  and	  provide	  some	  evidentiary	  support	  to	  legitimize	  those	  frustrations.	  They	  contribute	  to	  an	  ever-­‐growing	  body	  of	  research	  that	  questions	  British	  behavior	  to	  give	  victims	  of	  sectarian	  violence	  a	  better	  sense	  of	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closure	  and	  justice.	  Uncovering	  the	  truth	  helps	  communities	  let	  go	  of	  resentment,	  have	  closure,	  and	  heal.	  	  	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  my	  findings	  reflect	  the	  participant/observer	  position	  I	  held	  while	  conducting	  it.	  I	  was	  neither	  an	  activist	  nor	  a	  completely	  objective	  academic.	  However,	  I	  believe	  this	  position	  helped	  me	  bring	  an	  outsider’s	  perspective	  to	  an	  issue	  but	  also	  understand	  how	  my	  research	  could	  affect	  the	  community	  and	  inspired	  me	  to	  write	  in	  a	  way	  that	  could	  be	  beneficial	  for	  the	  people	  in	  the	  community	  I	  studied.	  Beyond	  the	  issue	  of	  sectarian	  assassinations,	  this	  paper	  highlights	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  incorporating	  more	  grassroots	  perspectives	  and	  goals	  into	  academic	  research.	  Academic	  research	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  uncover	  powerful	  truths.	  I	  think	  this	  power	  can	  be	  a	  powerful	  tool	  in	  healing	  communities	  and	  helping	  them	  transition	  out	  of	  times	  of	  conflict	  and	  should	  be	  utilized	  in	  areas	  all	  around	  the	  world.	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Appendix	  A:	  Sectarian	  Incidents	  	   Period	   By	  Protestant	  Extremists	   By	  Catholic	  Extremists	  Shootings	   Bombings	   Shootings	   Bombings	  1	  Jan-­‐	  22	  Mar	  76	   30	   37	   20	   34	  
22	  Mar-­‐	  29	  Mar	  76	   1	   -­‐-­‐	   1	   -­‐-­‐	  
	  Casualties	  from	  Sectarian	  Incidents	  	  
	   	  
	   By	  Protestant	  Extremists	   By	  Catholic	  Extremists	  Killed	   Wounded	   Killed	   Wounded	  1	  Jan-­‐	  22	  Mar	  76	   27	   110	   20	   35	  
22	  Mar-­‐	  29	  Mar	  76	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	  
42	  
Screening	  
	  	  Statistics	  found	  in	  The	  National	  Archives	  of	  the	  UK:	  Public	  Records	  Office.	  Tables	  recreated	  exactly	  as	  they	  appear	  in	  the	  documents.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Period	   Grand	  total	   3	  Bde	   8	  Bde	   39	  Bde	   Handed	  to	  RUC	  
Cat	   Prot	   Cat	   Prot	   Cat	   Prot	  Sep	  75-­‐20	  Mar	  76	   1994	   665	   21	   358	   10	   853	   87	   174	  Mar	  76-­‐27	  Mar	  76	   65	   3	   -­‐-­‐	   24	   -­‐-­‐	   36	   2	   9	  
